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RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS: DISTINGUISHING THE
"ENTERPRISE" ISSUES
The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970' (OCCA) contains twelve
substantive titles2 directed toward the eradication of organized crime in
the United States. Title IX of the Act, "Racketeer Influenced and
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 11, 15-16, 18-
19, 21, 28-29, 33, 42, 45-47, 49-50 U.S.C.). See [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007.
2. The titles are: Title I, Special Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976); Title II, Im-
munity of Witnesses, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Title III, Recalcitrant Wit-
nesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976); Title IV, False Declarations Before Grand Jury or Court, 18
U.S.C. § 1623 (1976); Title V, Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3481 note (1976); Title VI, Depositions to Preserve Testimony, 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1976); Title
VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Title
VIII, Obstruction of State or Local Law Enforcement, 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1976); Title IX, Racket-
eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Title
X, Increased Sentences for Dangerous Special Offenders, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-3578 (1976); Title XI,
Importation, Manufacture, Distribution and Storage of Explosive Materials, 18 U.S.C. §§ 841-848
(1976); Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 3331 note (1976). See
generaly Note, Organized Crime ControlAct of 1970, 4 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 546 (1971).
3. Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is highly sophisticated,
diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from
America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corrup-
tion; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained
from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing
of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs,
and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt
our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the
stability of the nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organi-
zations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign com-
merce, threaten domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and
its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-
gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of legally admissible evidence
necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime because the sanctions and remedies avail-
able to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United
States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Id. at 923 [hereinafter cited as Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose]. For general
accounts of organized crime's activities in the United States, see Johnson, Organized Crime: Chal-
lenge to the American Legal System, 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 399 (1962); Wilson, The Threat of
Organized Crime: Htighlighting the Challenging New Frontiers in Criminal Law, 46 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 41 (1970); Note, The Strike Force" Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime, 6
1343
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Corrupt Organizations" (RICO),4 is a result of congressional concern
over organized crime's increasing infiltration into the nation's demo-
cratic and economic institutions.' Through RICO, Congress sought to
eliminate the infiltration of organized crime6 and racketeering into le-
gitimate business organizations.
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 496, 498-500 (1970); Comment, Organized Crime: Developing Devices
for Debilitating Desperados, 1970 L. & Soc. ORDER 121, 121-22. For accounts of organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate businesses, see 116 CONG. REC. 22772 (1970); 115 CONG. REC.
17504 (1969); 0. BLAKEY, R. GOLDSTOCK & G. BRADLEY, THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECU-
TION OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND LABOR RACKETEERING; LABOR RACKETEERING: BACKGROUND
MATERIALS (LEAA Monograph, 1979); E. DEFRANCO, ANATOMY OF A SCAM: A CASE STUDY OF
A PLANNED BANKRUPTCY BY ORGANIZED CRIME (LEAA Monograph, 1973); McKeon, The Incur-
sion by Organized Crime into Legitimate Business, Symposium: Organized Crime, 20 J. PUB. L. 117
(1971). See generally G. BLAKEY, R. GOLDSTOCK & C. ROGOVIN, RACKETS BUREAUS: INVESTI-
GATION AND PROSECUTION OF ORGANIZED CRIME (LEAA Monograph, 1978); F. IANNI, ETHNIC
SUCCESSION IN ORGANIZED CRIME (LEAA Monograph, 1973); The Federal Effort Against Organ-
ized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Legal and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967); U.S. President's Comm. on Law Enforcement
and The Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime (1967).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
5. See Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 3.
6. See Note, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the
Confusion in Its Application and a Proposalfor Reform, 33 VAND. L. REV. 441, 441-42 n.4 (1980),
defining "organized crime" as "the expression used to describe different groups of individuals who
supply illegal goods and services-gambling, narcotics, and other forms of vice-to countless
numbers of citizen customers." It is clear that RICO is not restricted to application against mem-
bers of organized crime. Rather, "organized crime" is a generic term used to describe racketeering
activity and criminal behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 363-64 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
645, 646 (N.D. Il. 1980); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1018-19 (D. Md. 1976). But
see Barr v. WIU/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See generally Atkinson, "Rack-
eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S. C §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Crimi-
nal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1, 9-10 (1978).
7. See generally Hearings on S.30, and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized
Crime Before Subcomm No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 77-80
(1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Hearings on S.30 Before the Subcomn on Criminal
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 404-08 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGAN-
IZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1970, H.R. Doc. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39, 56-57 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT], reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4032-33;
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, S.
REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76-83, 159, 211, 214 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SENATE RE-
PORT]; MCCLELAN, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liber-
ties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141, 144 (1970); Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltration of
Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies/or "CriminalActivity", 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192, 204-06 (1975).
For a history of the legislation that became Title IX, see Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the
Courts: An Analysis ofRICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 838-45 (1980).
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RICO specifically proscribes the investment in, maintenance of an
interest in, participation in, or association with an "enterprise" through
a pattern of racketeering activity.8 Thus, it is defendants' involvement
with an "enterprise," and not their underlying racketeering acts, that
forms the basis of any RICO prosecution. 9 Due to the complexity of
RICO's statutory provisions, its broad language, and unique approach,
interpretation of the term "enterprise" has been a continuing source of
litigation since the statute's enactment in 1970.10 Much of this litiga-
tion has concerned the scope of the enterprise requirement. Until last
year the lower federal courts were in conflict over the extension of "en-
terprise" to cover wholly illegitimate organizations." The United
States Supreme Court recently upheld the position taken by most lower
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
9. Id.
10. The term "enterprise" as used in RICO has been held to apply to illegitimate organiza-
tions, see, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 993 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899
(1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 273 (6th Cir. 1979) (Engel, J., dissenting), vacated,
642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 545 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980), and governmental entities, see, e.g., United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d
804, 829 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Altomare, 625 F.2d 5, 7 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Karas, 624 F.2d 500,504 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United States v. Grant,
622 F.2d 308, 313 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980);
United States v. Burnsed, 566 F.2d 882, 884 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978);
United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1087-88 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072
(1978); United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347, 1349 (9th Cir. 1977). But see United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (D. Md. 1976).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980) (enterprise formed for illegal purpose is RICO enterprise); United States v. Sutton, 605
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (Engel J., dissenting) (enterprise not limited to ostensibly legitimate enter-
prises), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980) (enterprise's scope includes robbery, counterfeiting, mur-
der, and illegal use of explosives); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980) (enterprise's scope includes association to commit murder and extortion);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (enterprise in-
cludes association for illicit purpose); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977) (enterprise includes all enterprises); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d
436 (5th Cir. 1976) (enterprise includes association to defraud in illegal card games); United States
v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976) (enterprise not limited to legitimate businesses); United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (enterprise
includes illegal gambling business). Cf. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980)
(enterprise must exist separate and apart from commission of racketeering acts), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 1351 (1981). Contra, United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), (enterprise
limited to legitimate organizations), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d
260 (6th Cir. 1979) (enterprise limited to legitimate organizations), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th
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federal courts' 2 by ruling, in United States v. Turkette,13 that the term
"enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate
organizations.14
Although Turkette will likely resolve the legitimate/illegitimate dis-
pute, the decision left open an even more difficult question concerning
RICO's enterprise element. Most courts have implicitly concluded that
individuals associated only to commit racketeering acts are an enter-
prise. I5 This conclusion, in effect, eliminates the enterprise element
from RICO and alters the essential elements of a RICO offense as de-
termined by Congress.
The purpose of this Note is to examine these two issues concerning
the scope of the term "enterprise." Although Turkette settles the term's
application to illegitimate organizations, that decision failed to resolve
the term's application to individuals associated only to commit racke-
teering acts. 6 A final determination of this latter question is crucial to
both the scope and constitutional application of RICO.
This Note begins with an examination of RICO's statutory provi-
sions. It then reviews the legitimate/illegitimate disputes and the
Supreme Court's resolution of that dispute in Turkette. Finally, it dis-
cusses the still unresolved question of whether "enterprise" includes in-
dividuals associated only by a pattern of racketeering activities. This
Note concludes that although RICO's legislative history contemplates
an interpretation of the term "enterprise" encompassing only legitimate
Cir. 1980); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (same), overruled, United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976).
12. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir.
1980); United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United
States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States
v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cappetto,
502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). See also United States v. Castel-
lano, 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
13. 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
14. Id. at 2533-34.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (Engel, J., dissenting),
vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
16. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2533-34 (1981).
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organizations, RICO's statutory language permits the Turkelle inter-
pretation of the term "enterprise" as encompassing both legitimate and
illegitimate organizations. An interpretation of the term "enterprise"
that includes individuals associated in fact only to commit racketeer-
ing, however, violates RICO's statutory language and legislative his-
tory, fundamental principles of statutory construction, the principle of
federalism, and the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
In the final analysis, a broad interpretation of the term "enterprise" to
encompass individuals associated only to commit racketeering acts
reads the pivotal "enterprise" element out of RICO.
I. RICO's STATUTORY PROVISIONS
RICO's statutory provisions are complex and interrelated. Section
1962 of the statute defines RICO's substantive prohibitions. 17 Section
1962(a) prohibits the acquisition of an enterprise affecting interstate
commerce with income received from a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt.'" Section 1962(b) prohibits
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section
2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such
income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establish-
ment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for pur-
poses of investment, and without intention of controlling or participating in the control
of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection
if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family,
and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity of the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the
outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the
power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
The apparent purpose of§ 1962(a) is to prevent organized crime from gaining economic control of
legitimate business enterprises through the investment of proceeds from its illegal activities in such
enterprises. See Symposium, White-Collar Crime: Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO), 18 AM. CIuM. L. REV. 169, 308 (1980); Note, supra note 2, at 623; Note, Investing
Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control/Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 149
(1974).
Congressional power to prohibit activities made unlawful by state law stems from the constitu-
tional grant of power to regulate under the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Thus,
the activities prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1976) must affect interstate or foreign commerce.
See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing United States v.
Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019, 1021 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973)), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975). Cf. United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (minimal impact on
interstate commerce sufficient). See generally Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart
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the acquisition or maintenance of an interest in an enterprise affecting
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity or the
collection of an unlawful debt. 9 Section 1962(c) prohibits persons
from conducting the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate com-
merce through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an un-
lawful debt.2" Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of
section 1962.21
Section 1961 of RICO sets forth definitions clarifying the statute's
substantive prohibitions.22  A "pattern of racketeering activity" re-
quires the commission of two or more racketeering acts occurring
within ten years of each other, with at least one racketeering act occur-
ring after October 15, 1970, the effective date of the statute. 3 "Racke-
teering activity" is defined as any act or threat in violation of one or
more than thirty state and federal laws.' Any single violation of the
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Note, supra note 7, at 207-22.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
Section 1962(b) differs from § 1962(a), see note 18 supra, in that it does not require the direct use
of income in the acquisition of an interest in the enterprise. See Note, supra note 2, at 624.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debts.
Section 1962(c)'s aim is to prevent organized crime from using a legitimate business as a basis for
conducting racketeering activities. See Note, supra note 2, at 624.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1976) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1976).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) provides:
"[A] pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,
one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which oc-
curred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of
a prior act of racketeering activity.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. In 1979) provides:
"[R]acketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous
drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year, (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of
title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to
sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relat-
ing to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious,
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enumerated provisions is a "racketeering act" that forms the necessary
basis of a "pattern of racketeering activity."25 "Enterprise" is defined
broadly in section 1961(4) as including any "individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. 2 6
RICO prescribes severe criminal penalties for conviction under its
substantive provisions, including a fine of up to $25,000, imprisonment
for up to twenty-five years, and forfeiture of interests acquired or main-
tained in violation of the statute.27 In addition to criminal penalties,
RICO prescribes broad civil remedies,2" modeled after the antitrust
section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894
(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of
gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to
obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State
or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery
or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),
sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections
2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-2424 (relating
to white slave traffic); (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code,
section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving
fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
25. See notes 23-24 supra (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), -(5) (1976)).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) provides that "'enterprise' includes any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity."
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976) provides:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall forfeit to the
United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of section 1962,
and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, oper-
ated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of section
1962.
For a discussion of the criminal penalty provisions of RICO, see Atkinson, supra note 6, at 15-17.
See also [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4081-84.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, includ-
ing, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or
indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable retrictions on the future activities or in-
vestments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from en-
gaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which
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laws,29 for persons injured by racketeering activity.30 The final sections
of RICO provide special rules governing venue and process, 3' expedi-
tion of actions,32 and investigative proceedings for actions brought
under the statute.33 Finally, RICO's legislative history contains a man-
date that the statute's provisions "shall be liberally construed to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes. 34
affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In any ac-
tion brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as
practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending final determination
thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take
such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall
deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee.
(d) A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any criminal
proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the defendant
from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil
proceeding brought by the United States.
See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 106; Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 108, 467; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 80-81; Atkinson, supra note 6, at 17-18; Symposium, supra note 18, at
317; Note, supra note 2, at 625-27; Note, supra note 7, at 207-22; 25 DEPAUL L. REv. 508 (1976).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See generally Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 408; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 81, 160, 214.
30. See note 28 supra.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1976).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1966 (1976).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1976). Section 1968 is modeled after the civil investigative demand
procedure employed in antitrust investigations. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 161; Note,
supra note 7, at 195 n.22. Section 1967 of the statute concerns public access to proceedings.
34. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title IX, § 904, 84 Stat.
947 provides:
(a) The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.
(b) Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law
imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for
in this title.
(c) Nothing contained in this title shall impair the authority of any attorney represent-
ing the United States to-
(1) lay before any grand jury impaneled by any district court of the United States
any evidence concerning any alleged racketeering violation of law;
(2) invoke the power of any such court to compel the production of any evidence
before any such grand jury; or
(3) institute any proceeding to enforce any order or process issued in execution of
such power or to punish disobedience of any such order or process by any person.
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II. THE LEGITIMATE/ILLEGITIMATE ORGANIZATION QUESTION
By holding, in United States v. Turkette,35 that the "enterprise" term
in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate organizations,
the Supreme Court settled a sharply disputed question of the statute's
construction.
A. Early Case Law: United States v. Parness and United States v.
Cappetto
In United States v. Parness,36 a federal court of appeals first ad-
dressed the scope of the term "enterprise" as used in RICO. In Par-
ness, the defendant acquired a foreign corporation with funds derived
from criminal activity in the United States. 7 The Second Circuit, in
holding that the defendant violated RICO's section 1962(b) substantive
prohibition against acquiring an interest in an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity,38 found that the term "enterprise" in-
cludes foreign corporations.39 In justifying its broad interpretation of
the term "enterprise," the court reasoned that the statutory language
did not limit the scope of the term "enterprise" to domestic corpora-
tions.4 ° Moreover, the court believed that RICO's legislative history
reflected specific concern about the effect of organized crime activities
on the American economy.4 ' Because the investment of illegally de-
rived profits in a foreign corporation does not preclude a detrimental
effect on the American economy, the legislative history reflects an in-
tent to include foreign corporations within the scope of the term "enter-
prise. 42 Thus, the Parness court reasoned, the term "enterprise"
encompasses both domestic and foreign corporations.43
The Second Circuit decision in Parness provided the groundwork for
future expansive interpretations of the term "enterprise." Following
the lead of the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Cappetto" addressed the "enterprise" issue, but in an entirely different
35. 101 S. CL 2524 (1981).
36. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
37. Id. at 438-39.
38. See note 19 supra.
39. 503 F.2d at 439.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, supra note 3).
42. 503 F.2d at 439.
43. Id.
44. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
Number 4] 1351
Washington University Open Scholarship
1352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
context. In Cappetto the government alleged that the defendants vio-
lated sections 1962(b) and (c) of RICO45 by acquiring and conducting
an illegal gambling operation through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.46 The Seventh Circuit, addressing the scope of "enterprise," cited
Parness for the proposition that "enterprise" should be defined
broadly. 7 The court found no language in RICO limiting the scope of
the term "enterprise" to solely legitimate organizations and thus held
that illegitimate organizations were included within the scope of the
term "enterprise.
48
In its zeal to bring the illegal gambling operation within RICO's am-
bit, the Cappetto court committed two profound errors.49 First, to sup-
port its conclusion that the term "enterprise" includes illegal
organizations, the court relied upon legislative history from Title VIII
of the Organized Crime Control Act, which prohibits illegal gambling
operations. 50 The court, however, did not cite or refer to any statement
in the legislative history of Title IX, the RICO provision under analy-
sis, to support its holding.5' Second, the Cappetto court improperly
reasoned that section 1962(a) of the statute applied solely to legitimate
organizations, while sections 1962(b) and (c) dealt with both legitimate
and illegitimate organizations.52 The court's divisive interpretation of
section 1962 departs from the rule of statutory interpretation that por-
tions of a statute be construed consistently53 and transgresses the statu-
tory purpose implicitly expressed in section 1961(4) of RICO defining
45. For the text of § 1962(b), -(c), see notes 19-20 supra.
46. 502 F.2d at 1355.
47. Id. at 1358.
48. Id.
49. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 852-53; Comment, Title IXofthe Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in Its Interpretation, 27 DEPAUL L. Rav. 89, 93-94
(1977); Note, supra note 7, at 201-02; Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law andthe Judi-
cial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REv. 109, 114-15 (1979).
50. 502 F.2d at 1358. The segment of legislative history cited by the Cappetto court came
from Senate Report 91-617 and addressed the Crime Control Act of 1970, aimed at syndicated
gambling. Atkinson created the same error in citing the legislative history of Title VIII for a
broad interpretation of "enterprise" in Title IX. Atkinson, supra note 6, at 13 n.105.
51. See 502 F.2d at 1358.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 269 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th
Cir. 1980); Comment, supra note 49, at 93-94; Note, supra note 7, at 201-02. See W. STATSKY,
LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: How TO USE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 100 (1975); 2A J. SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTORY CONsTRucTIoN §§ 51.01-.03 (4th ed. 1973).
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the term "enterprise.""
The significance of Cappetto 's analytical errors lies in the fact that it
was the initial decision to expand the term "enterprise" beyond the
scope of legitimate organizations. Thus, it opened the door for later
expansive interpretations of the term." Subsequent circuit court deci-
sions addressing the scope of the term "enterprise" relied repeatedly on
both Parness and Cappetto for the proposition that the term "enter-
prise" should be broadly construed.16 Thus, the decisional basis upon
which these cases rests is, at best, infirm. An examination of RICO's
legislative history also suggests that Congress did not intend that the
term "enterprise" include illegitimate organizations.
B. RICO's Legislative History
Post-Cappetto circuit court decisions holding that the term "enter-
prise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises bol-
stered their analyses by referring to the broad definition of "enterprise"
contained in the statute,57 portions of the Statement of Findings and
Purposes of the Organized Crime Control Act relating to the Act's
broad purpose, and RICO's mandate for liberal construction of its pro-
visions. 8 Although these sources provide some support for the broad
54. See note 26 supra; Comment, supra note 49, at 93-94; Note, supra note 7, at 201-02.
55. Cappetto was the first court to interpret "enterprise" as including illegal organizations.
But see United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083, 1091 n.17 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1072 (1978), citing United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (1974), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1105
(1975), as holding that "enterprise" encompasses illegal entities. Parness, however, held that "en-
terprise" encompasses foreign corporations and it addressed the illegal "enterprise" issue only in
dictum.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1020 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Castellano, 416
F. Supp. 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also United States
v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979) (no independent examination of RICO's legislative his-
tory), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978)
(same), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977)
(same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979), ceri. denied, 445 U.S.
946 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 n.17 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
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interpretation of the term "enterprise," their persuasive efficacy pales
against an examination of RICO's legislative history.
RICO's legislative history reveals specific congressional concern with
the ruinous economic consequences of organized crime's continued in-
filtration of legitimate business organizations. 9 In addition, the history
contains express statements made by Senator McClellan, the original
sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act, reflecting an intent to
limit the scope of the term "enterprise" to legitimate businesses.6
Statements in the House6' and Senate,62 recommendations to Congress
by the Justice Department,63 and statements of dissenting members of
Congress' further reflect the intent to limit the application of RICO to
infiltration by organized crime into legitimate enterprises.
Although the legislative history lacks explicit refutation of the propo-
sition that a Title IX enterprise encompasses illegitimate organizations,
the repeated references to legitimate business enterprises reflect con-
gressional concurrence in the conclusion that the term "enterprise" re-
ferred only to legitimate organizations. 65  RICO's legislative history
thus indicates that the statute is aimed at the infiltration by organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in inter-
state commerce.
Investigations of organized crime and racketeering found that organ-
953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977). See also notes 3 & 4 supra.
59. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 7, at 77-80; Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 387,
404-08; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 35, 39, 56-57; SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 76-83.
See generally Bradley, supra note 7, at 837-45; Note, supra note 7, at 196-206; Note, supra note 49,
at 109.
60. See 116 CONG. REc. 585, 591 (1970); House Hearings, supra note 7, at 106. See also
McClellan, supra note 7, at 141, 144.
61. See 116 CONG. REc. 35196-97, 35206,35260,35295, 35318, 35361 (1970); House Hearings,
supra note 7, at 77-80, 188; House REPORT, supra note 7, at 39, 56-57.
62. See 116 CONG. REc. 591, 602-03, 607, 953 (1970); SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 76-
83, 159, 211, 214.
63. See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 404-08.
64. See 116 CONG. REC. 591, 602-03, 607, 953 (1970) (dissenters in Senate); id. at 35196-97,
35200, 35206, 35295, 35318, 35361 (dissenters in House); Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 489-92
(statement by the American Civil Liberties Union); HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 185-86 (dis-
senting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at
211, 214 (concurring view of Senator Scott).
65. Only two brief references in the legislative history of RICO concern the statute's applica-
tion to legitimate and illegitimate organizations. See 116 CONG. REc. 844 (1970) (discussion
among Sens. Magnuson, McClellan, and Hruska); id. at 35328 (remark by Rep. Meskill); Note,
supra note 7, at 206 n.75.
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ized crime employs three methods to attain ownership, control, and op-
eration of legitimate organizations.66 First, after establishing a
financial base with illegally obtained funds, the racketeer then invests
the funds in legitimate enterprises. Second, persons outside of a legiti-
mate enterprise gain control of the enterprise through racketeering
methods, such as extortion and the illegal sale, manipulation, and own-
ership of a shareholder interest. Third, inside employees, associates of
trade groups or union members, use racketeering methods to conduct
the legitimate business through illegitimate means, eventually cor-
rupting the enterprise.
RICO's substantive prohibitions directly parallel the investigative
findings. Section 1962(a) prohibits the legitimate acquisition of an in-
terest in a legitimate organization with illegally obtained funds.67 Sec-
tion 1962(b) prohibits the illegal acquisition of an interest in or control
of an enterprise through established practices, 68 and subsection (c) pro-
hibits illegal operation of an enterprise through defined racketeering
activities. 69 The parallels between the legislative findings of the meth-
ods used to infiltrate legitimate organizations and the plain wording of
RICO's substantive prohibitions reinforce the argument that section
1962 represents an integrated scheme dealing with organized crime's
infiltration of legitimate organizations.70
Moreover, Section 848 of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act,7' enacted shortly after RICO, confirms that Congress knew how to
draft legislation prohibiting illegal or criminal enterprises. Section 848
directly addresses continuing criminal enterprises involving traffic in
narcotics.72 If the term "enterprise" in RICO is broadly interpreted,
RICO effectively absorbs the continuing criminal enterprise section of
66. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 900 (1st Cir. 1980), rey'don other grounds,
101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981); SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 76-77; Bradley, supra note 7, at 842-45.
67. See note 18 supra.
68. See note 19 supra.
69. See note 20 supra.
70. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 900 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2524
(1981).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976).
72. 21 U.S.C. § 848(b) (1976) provides:
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a continuing
criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter
the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter
or subchapter II of this chapter-
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the Act.7
3
C. Rules of Statutory Construction
Courts broadly interpreting the term "enterprise" disregard several
basic maxims of statutory construction 74 available to guide courts in
proper statutory analysis.75  One such maxim counsels that related stat-
utes, or portions thereof, be read inparimateria, or in harmony. 76 Ap-
plication of the rule to RICO requires that the term "enterprise" be
interpreted consistently throughout sections 1962(a), (b), and (c). 77 In
United States v. Cappetto,78 however, the court violated the rule by
reading the term "enterprise" restrictively in section 1962(a) but
broadly in sections 1962(b) and (c). 79
A second principle of statutory construction, ejusdem generis,0 coun-
sels that broad statutory language be construed in light of prior specific
language so that the general terms encompass only objects similar in
nature to the objects of the specific terms.8 ' Application of the doctrine
to the statutory definition of "enterprise" in section 1961(4)82 requires
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concern with five or more other
persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a super-
visory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
73. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 902-03 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2524
(1981). See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976).
74. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53, § 45.04, stating that the words "construction" and
"interpretation" as describing the process of judicial behavior in determining legislative intent,
can be used interchangeably. The words "construction" and "interpretation" are used inter-
changeably throughout this text.
75. See generally United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d
1001 (6th Cir. 1980); Comment, supra note 49, at 93-94; Note, supra note 7, at 201-02; Note, supra
note 48, at 117.
76. See United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 269 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1980); 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53, §§ 51.01-.03.
77. See note 18-21 supra.
78. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
79. Id. at 1358. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Insca, 496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1974).
mhe doctrine of ejusdem generis warns against expansively interpreting broad language
which immediately follows narrow and specific terms .... [It] counsels courts to con-
strue the broad in light of the narrow, in a common-sense recognition that general and
specific words, when present together, are associated with and take color from each
other.
Id. at 206. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53, § 47.17. See also United States v. Altese, 542
F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
81. W. STRATSKY, supra note 53, at 100; 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53, § 47.17, at 103.
82. See note 26 supra.
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that the general language "other legal entity" and "group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity" be interpreted in light of
the specific terms "partnership" and "corporation."83 Because the spe-
cific terms denote only legal entities, the general terms, "other legal
entity" and "group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity," must refer only to organizations with some legal existence or
purpose.84 Courts expansively interpreting the term "enterprise" have
failed to recognize the doctrine of ejusdem generis.85
RICO's mandate for liberal construction, directing that the statute
"be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes," 86 trans-
gresses the traditional rule requiring strict construction of criminal stat-
utes and resolution of ambiguities in favor of lenity.87 Courts favoring
an interpretation of the term "enterprise" that encompasses illegitimate
organizations frequently rely on the direction for liberal construction as
support.88
Arguments for narrow interpretation of "enterprise," on the other
hand, focus on RICO's legislative history and the effects of a liberal
construction of RICO. The legislative history reveals that the statute's
remedial purpose is the elimination of the influence of organized crime
on legitimate economic organizations.89 Moreover, due process re-
quires that criminal statutes be written to give fair notice of the conduct
83. Id.
84. See Comment, supra note 49, at 95-96; Note, supra note 49, at 119-20. See also United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
85. See, e.g., United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039
(1977).
86. See note 34 supra.
87. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971); United States v. Bell, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53,
§§ 59.03-.06. See also United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 905 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct.
2524 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980).
88. See, e-g., United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001
(6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897-98 n.17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977);
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975);
United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 139 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Castellano, 416 F.
Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). See also United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 415 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978).
89. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
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they prohibit.9" The liberal construction mandate directly confficts
with due process when applied to expand RICO beyond the scope of
penal prohibitions apparent on the face of the statute.91
A plain reading of RICO's prohibitive provisions as a whole suggests
a narrow interpretation of the term "enterprise." If the term "enter-
prise" is read to include wholly illegitimate organizations, the statutory
provisions for criminal forfeiture9 2 and civil reform of corrupted orga-
nizations93 cannot apply when the enterprise is wholly illegitimate.94
When a legitimate organization is corrupted by criminal activity and
racketeering practices, the criminal forfeiture and civil reform sections
of RICO apply to purge the organization of the criminal elements so
that it can continue to function as a rehabilitated and wholly legal eco-
nomic entity. When an enterprise is wholly illegitimate, however, the
criminal forfeiture and civil reform provisions are inapplicable to
restructure or rehabilitate the enterprise. An enterprise that is wholly
illegitimate must cease to exist after prosecution. The statute's criminal
and civil remedial provisions cannot be effectuated when the enterprise
is wholly illegitimate because after prosecution of such an enterprise
nothing remains to rehabilitate or reform. Thus, reading the term "en-
terprise" to include other than legitimate organizations is anomalous.95
Such a divisive interpretation of the statute violates the notion of statu-
tory construction requiring that statutes be read as an integral whole.96
D. The Turkette Decision
In United States v. Turkette97 the Supreme Court, rejecting each of
the arguments for a narrow reading of the "enterprise" element, held
that the term encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate
organizations. 98
Preliminarily, the Court looked to the language of the statute, noting
90. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3; id., amend. V. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d
1358, 1369 (8th Cir. 1980).
91. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 266 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970).
94. Note, supra note 49, at 119.
95. Id.
96. Id See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 53, § 51.01-.03.
97. 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
98. Id. at 2533-34.
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that an unambiguous statute was conclusive in the absence of clearly
expressed legislative input to the contrary. 99 The Court concluded that
the enterprise definition-"any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity"0----was unambiguous.
In the absence of any explicit attempt to restrict the definition to legal
organizations, the Court found that it clearly extended to both legiti-
mate and illegitimate groups.' 01
The Turkette Court believed that RICO's legislative history also
mandated this interpretation of the enterprise requirement. Although
the Court agreed that the statute's main concern was the infiltration of
legitimate businesses by organized crime,' 02 it did not believe that this
suggested a narrower interpretation. 3 Instead, the Court stated, Con-
gress intended to protect legitimate businesses by striking at the heart
of organized crime, whether legitimate or not.'" Moreover, the Court
relied upon the statutory language, which it believed clearly supported
a broad interpretation as "the most reliable evidence of [Congressional]
intent."10 5
The Turkelle decision rejected the ejusdem generis rationale for a
narrow reading of the enterprise element. °6 First, the Court noted that
ejusdem generis was inapplicable to the construction of unambiguous
statutory language.0 7 Second, the Court suggested that even if ejusdem
generis were applied, it would not require a narrow interpretation of
the statute.'0 8
99. Id. at 2527.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
101. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2527 (1981).
102. Id. at 2532.
103. Id. at 2532-33.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2533.
106. Id. at 2527-28. See generally notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
107. Id. at 2528.
108. Id. Thus, the Court stated:
Section 1961(4) describes two categories of associations that come within the purview
of the "enterprise" definition. The first encompasses organizations such as corporations
and partnerships, and other "legal entities." The second covers "any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." . . . Each category describes a
separate type of enterprise to be covered by the statute--those that are recognized as
legal entities and those that are not. The latter is not a more general description of the
former. The second category itself not containing any specific enumeration that is fol-
lowed by a general description, ejusdem generis has no bearing on the meaning to be
attributed to that part of § 1961(4).
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Similarly, the Court dismissed the argument urging lenity in the con-
struction of criminal statutesm1 as inapplicable when the statutory lan-
guage is clear. 110 Moreover, noted the Court, the rule of lenity requires
not that statutes be given their narrowest meaning but only that they be
given a fair construction according to Congressional intent."'
Finally, the Court rejected the suggestion that the criminal forfeiture
and civil reform provisions of RICO, which apply only to legitimate
organizations, require a narrow reading of the "enterprise" term." 2
The Court said that the provision would be useful in eliminating organ-
ized crime in both legitimate and illegitimate organizations." 13 More-
over, the Court stated that even if some of the civil remedies were
useful only in the context of legitimate organizations, there would be
no inference that Congress intended to so limit the statute." 4 Instead,
the Court reasoned, Congress might have intended to provide for civil
remedies only when they were useful."'
The Turkette decision's expansive definition of the term "enterprise"
does find support in RICO's statutory language and mandate for liberal
construction." 6 Although this interpretation gives little weight to the
statute's legislative history" 7 and well-settled principles of statutory
construction," 8 it does not represent a critical expansion of the stat-
ute." 9 Thus, under the Turkette interpretation of "enterprise," if a
group of individuals participates in and receives funds from an illegal
narcotics distribution operation and uses the proceeds from the illegal
operation to acquire an interest in an illegal gambling operation, it vio-
lates RICO. The individuals used funds derived from a pattern of
racketeering activity to acquire an interest in an illegal enterprise, a
Id. (footnote omitted). The court went on to note that eusdem generis would not aid Turkette
even if the more general language of the second clause were limited by the specific language of the
first. Because each of the specific examples, such as individuals and partnerships, were entities
that could "act totally beyond the pale of the law," it would not limit the general language inclu-
sion of an illegitimate organization. Id. at 2528 n.4.
109. Id. at 2531 n.10. See generally note 87 supra and accompanying text.
110. 101 S. Ct. at 2531 n.10.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2529-30.
113. Id. at 2530.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See notes 95-115 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 56-72 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 73-86 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 854-55.
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violation of section 1962(b). The "enterprise" is the illegal gambling
operation that exists separate and apart from the underlying racketeer-
ing activity of the narcotics distribution operation.
III. THE ENTERPRISE PATTERN OF RACKETEERING PROBLEM
Most courts, seemingly unaware of a more serious problem of con-
struction presented by the RICO "enterprise" issue, have expanded
RICO's scope far beyond that intended by Congress by concluding that
individuals associated in fact only to commit a pattern of racketeering
activity are an "enterprise" for purposes of RICO. 2 ' In the above ex-
ample, if the individuals did not use the proceeds of the narcotics distri-
bution operation to acquire an interest in anything, but merely
associated to conduct the illegal distribution operation, the enterprise
element of the offense would seem to have disappeared. The individu-
als merely associated to commit a pattern of racketeering activity, that
is, illegal acts of drug distribution.
Many federal courts, however, implicitly have concluded on the basis
of facts similar to those in the example that individuals' association to
commit illegal racketeering acts is an enterprise for purposes of
RICO. 2 ' Such analysis defines the "enterprise" in terms of the defend-
ants' association to commit a pattern of racketeering activity when no
enterprise in fact exists.'22 An examination of cases addressing the "en-
terprise" issue illustrates the confusion engendered when courts implic-
itly conclude that individuals associated in fact only to commit a
pattern of racketeering activity are an enterprise for purposes of RICO.
In United States v. Aleman,123 the Seventh Circuit found that a series
of robberies committed by the defendants established a RICO "pattern
of racketeering activity."' 24 The court then held, on the basis of
120. See, ag., United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Diecidue,
603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1939 (1977); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 925 (1975). See Bradley, supra note 7, at 853-55.
121. See cases cited in note 120 supra.
122. See Bradley, .upra note 7, at 853-55. See also United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1368-72 (8th Cir. 1980).
123. 609 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
124. Id. at 301.
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RICO's broad language and decisions of other circuits, that the term
"enterprise" encompasses illegitimate organizations. 25 Finally, the
court implicitly found that the defendants' association with one another
in committing the pattern of racketeering activity constituted an "enter-
prise" under RICO. 12 6 Proof of the defendants' association in commit-
ting the predicate racketeering acts or pattern of racketeering activity
established proof of the enterprise.
The reasoning implicit in Aleman, employed similarly by other fed-
eral courts addressing the scope of the term "enterprise," '27 reads the
enterprise element out of RICO, and the statute consequently becomes
a mere proscription against patterns of a racketeering. Neither RICO's
legislative history' nor its statutory language 129 supports an interpre-
tation that defines the existence of an enterprise solely on the basis of
the defendants' racketeering acts. Rather, the language in the substan-
tive and definitional portions of the statute contemplates the existence
of an enterprise separate and distinct from the underlying criminal and
racketeering activities. 130 Defendants must invest in, maintain an in-
terest in, acquire control of, or be employed by or associated with an
enterprise, whether legal or illegal, that is distinct from the defendants'
mere association for racketeering purposes.' 3 1
Several federal courts have come close to disentangling the funda-
mental issue of whether defendants associated in fact only to commit
racketeering acts constitute an enterprise from the question of the legit-
imacy or illegitimacy of an enterprise under RICO. The Sixth Circuit
in United States v. Sutton, 3 2 a panel decision later withdrawn and re-
versed by the court en banc, focused on the former question.133 The
court realized that a definition of "enterprise" including defendants as-
sociated only to commit racketeering acts effectively eliminates the stat-
utory enterprise element and the necessity of proving the existence of
an "enterprise." '134 The court reasoned that common sense and the
125. Id. at 304-05.
126. Id.
127. See cases cited in note 120 supra.
128. See notes 3, 28 & 59 supra and accompanying text.
129. See notes 18-21 & 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated, 642 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1980).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 265.
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plain meaning rule require a construction of the term "enterprise" de-
fining an entity "larger than and conceptually distinct from 'any pat-
tern of racketeering activity.' 135 Although the bulk of the Sutton
opinion focused on whether racketeering acts alone could satisfy
RICO's "enterprise" element, the court's holding was limited to the
more traditional legitimate/illegitimate dispute. 136 The Sutton hold-
ing, therefore, does not provide a direct answer to the question of
whether defendants associated in fact only to commit racketeering acts
constitute an enterprise under RICO.
The Eighth Circuit directly addressed the issue in United States v.
Anderson. 137 The Anderson court began by addressing the narrow issue
of whether the term "enterprise" encompasses an illegal association
proved only by facts that also establish the predicate pattern of racke-
teering activity.' 38 Reasoning that a definition of "enterprise" relying
solely on the existence of acts that form the pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity would alter the fundamental elements of a RICO offense, 139 the
Anderson court found that the term "enterprise" "must signify an asso-
ciation substantially different from the acts that form the pattern of
racketeering activity.'140 The legislative history of RICO, 14 ' the organ-
ization and structure of the Organized Crime Control Act,142 funda-
mental rules of statutory interpretation, 43 and the severe federal
intrusion on state criminal jurisdiction if "enterprise" were defined sy-
nonymously with the defendants' association to commit racketeering
activities'" convinced the court that proof of an enterprise cannot rest
solely on proof of an association to commit the crimes that form a pat-
tern of racketeering activity. Rather, the term "enterprise" encom-
passed only "an association having an ascertainable structure which
exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an ec-
onomic goal that can be defined apart from the commission of the
predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' ,,"45
135. Id. at 266.
136. Id. at 270; Bradley, supra note 7, at 854.
137. 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).
138. Id. at 1365.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1371-72.
142. Id. at 1370.
143. Id. at 1366-67.
144. Id. at 1370-72.
145. Id. at 1372. The holding of the Anderson court is specific:
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Thus, the Anderson court's analysis successfully distinguished the is-
sue of whether defendants associated only to commit racketeering acts
constitute an "enterprise" from the issue of the legitimacy or illegiti-
macy of an enterprise for RICO purposes. By focusing on the necessity
of an economic association existing separate and apart from the racke-
teering activity rather than on the legality or illegality of the enterprise,
the court addressed an issue fundamental to the proper application of
the statute.146
After the Eighth Circuit decision in Anderson, the First Circuit deci-
sion in United States v. Turkette147 repeated the analytical error that the
Sixth Circuit committed in Sutton. In Turkette, the defendants alleg-
edly conducted the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate com-
merce through a pattern of racketeering in violation of section
1962(c). 148 The Turkette court properly reasoned that a broad interpre-
tation of the term "enterprise" to include defendants associated to com-
mit racketeering acts would render that term wholly synonymous with
the statutory definition of "pattern of racketeering activity."'1 49 The
court concluded, however, that remedying the redundancy created by a
broad interpretation of the term "enterprise" required limiting the defi-
nition of "enterprise" to legitimate organizations.15 0
The Supreme Court's decision in Turkette,15 1 of course, repudiated
the First Circuit's attempt to limit the enterprise requirement to legiti-
mate groups.1 52 On the more difficult question of whether an enterprise
could be established by proof of a pattern of racketeering activity
alone, though, the Court was more ambiguous.
We hold that Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity," as used in the definition of the term "enterprise" in
section 1961(4), to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure
which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal
that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commisison of the predicate acts
constituting the "pattern of racketeering activity."
Id. The court then distinguished the holding of the Sixth Circuit in Sutton: "We differ from [the
Sutton] holding only to the extent that we do not rest our holding on the word 'legitimate' but
rather on the need for a discrete economic association existing separately from the racketeering
activity." Id. (citing Bradley, supra note 7, at 854-55).
146. 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980).
147. 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
148. Id. at 898.
149. Id. at 899.
150. Id.
151. 101 S. Ct. 2524 (1981).
152. See notes 95-115 spra and accompanying text.
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Although the Court noted that the enterprise was an element distinct
from the pattern of racketeering, requiring separate proof, it also indi-
cated that the evidence required to prove both the existence of an enter-
prise and a pattern of racketeering activity would in some cases
coalesce. 153 In this respect the Court's opinion may indicate that the
enterprise can in some cases be proven through evidence of a pattern of
racketeering activity. Moreover, although the government conceded
that "proof of a pattern of racketeering activity in itself would not be
sufficient to establish the existence of an enterprise," 154 the Court felt
obliged to explain its decision "even if that were not the case." 155 Thus,
the Supreme Court failed to resolve definitely the issue in Turkette.
The implicit conclusion that defendant's pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity is an enterprise eliminates the government's burden of proving
the existence of an enterprise. Once the government demonstrates the
existence of a pattern of racketeering under section 1961(5), it need
only point to the defendants' association in committing the pattern of
illegal acts in order to prove the enterprise. Thus, in United States v.
Rone, 56 the Ninth Circuit sustained the government's theory that de-
fendants' association in a wide range of unlawful activity, including
murder and extortion, 57 constituted both the "pattern of racketeering
activity"1 58 and the "enterprise."' 159
The operation and structure of the Organized Crime Control Act' 60
warns against an interpretation of the term "enterprise" that includes
defendants' mere association to commit a pattern of crimes. Title VIII
of the Act extends federal criminal jurisdiction to illegal gambling op-
erations that comprise five or more persons and that either continue
over a specified period of time or gross revenues above a prescribed
amount.' 6' These conditions on the size and scope of illegal gambling
operations restrict federal jurisdiction over illegal gambling organiza-
153. United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528-29 (1981).
154. Id. at 2529 n.5.
155. Id.
156. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
157. Id. at 567.
158. Id. at 566-67.
159. Id. at 568-69.
160. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in
scattered sections of 7, 11, 15-16, 18-19, 21, 28-29, 33, 42, 45-47, 49-50 U.S.C.). See [1970] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007; note 100 supra and accompanying text.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1976). Title VIII of the Act proscribes gambling businesses illegal
under state law, that involve five or more persons, and are either in operation for at least 30 days
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tions to those of substantial size. 16 2
Defining the RICO enterprise requirement in terms of the defend-
ants' association to commit illegal acts effectively circumvents the Title
VIII restrictions on the size and scope of gambling operations. 163
Under RICO, the government can prosecute any two illegal gambling
acts occurring within ten years of each other and affecting interstate
commerce. The defendants' series of illegal gambling acts forms the
pattern of racketeering activity, and the enterprise is the illegal organi-
zation consisting of the defendants' association in committing the ille-
gal gambling acts. 1" Because RICO does not limit the size or scope of
the enterprise, relatively insubstantial gambling operations qualify as
an enterprise under the statute, and RICO is thus used to avoid the
Title VIII conditions on the size and scope of gambling operations.
Congress, however, did not intend that RICO's federal jurisdiction and
sizeable criminal penalties be extended to small scale illegal gambling
operations.165 Rather, the size and scope provisions of Title VIII of the
Organized Crime Control Act reflect that Congress intended to subject
only substantial gambling organizations to federal criminal
jurisdiction. 166
or gross more than $2,000 a day. See [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4003, 4009, 4028-32;
McClellan, supra note 7, at 133-40.
162. See, e.g., United States v. Ianelli, 420 U.S. 770, 787 (1975): "Major gambling activities
were a principal focus of congressional concern. Large-scale gambling enterprises were seen to be
both a substantive evil and a source of funds for other criminal conduct." Id. (citing SENATE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 71-73).
163. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 869, 902 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'don othergrounds, 101 S.
Ct. 2524 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975), overruled, United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104
(1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1939 (1977). See Bradley, supra note 7, at 856-57; Comment, upra
note 49, at 101; Note, supra note 49, at 120-21.
164. See, eg., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420
U.S. 925 (1975).
165. Application of severe criminal penalties that in many cases exceed the penalties for the
individual crimes underlying the RICO violation to the small-time operator engaged in petty gam-
bling, drug dealing, or extortion subjects the defendant to cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the eighth amendment The Sixth Circuit held in Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th
Cir. 1975), vacatedand remanded, 423 U.S. 993 (1975), that "a sentence which is disproportionate
to the crime for which it is administered may be held to violate the Eighth Amendment solely
because of the length of imprisonment imposed." Id. at 1290. See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 15-
17.
166. See lanelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 787-90 (1975) (§ 1955 requirements on size and
scope of gambling operations reflect an intent to limit federal intervention to cases in which fed-
eral interests are substantially implicated, leaving to local law enforcement efforts the prosecution
of small-scale gambling activities).
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Several issues of constitutional magnitude arise if individuals associ-
ated in fact only to commit a pattern of racketeering activity constitute
a RICO "enterprise."' 67 Fundamental among these concerns is that a
broad interpretation of "enterprise" leads to federal usurpation of state
criminal jurisdiction over small-scale criminal activities. 168
RICO's legislative history reveals specific concern with organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate business enterprises. 69 It is this con-
cern that motivated Congress to extend federal criminal jurisdiction to
enterprises operating in interstate commerce. Where the enterprise ele-
ment is eliminated from the statute and the term "enterprise" is ren-
dered redundant of patterns of racketeering activity, the commission of
any two criminal acts within ten years of each other, punishable under
state law by imprisonment for more than one year, subjects the crimi-
nal behavior to prosecution under RICO. Under this broad interpreta-
tion of the term "enterprise" federal criminal jurisdiction is extended to
practically every criminal activity affecting interstate commerce. Be-
cause the offenses encompassed by the phrase "racketeering activity"
167. RICO has been the subject of various constitutional challenges: (1) vagueness, see
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980);
United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d
352, 364 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430,
440-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1105 (1975); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975); United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp.
125, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
afl'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Scalzitti, 408
F. Supp. 1014, 1015-16 (W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 883-84 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); (2) lack of authority under commerce clause and invasions into state power, see
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975);
United States v. Castellano, 416 F. Supp. 125, 131 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); e f United States v. Fineman,
434 F. Supp. 189, 195 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (minimal impact on interstate commerce sufficient); (3) vio-
lation of prohibition against ex post facto laws and avoidance of statutes of limitations, see United
States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); United
States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364-65 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976);
United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp.
997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976); (4) double jeopardy and multiplicity, see United States v. Frumento, 563
F.2d 1083, 1088-89 (3d Cir. 1977), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); United States v. Hansen, 422
F. Supp. 430, 433-34 (E.D. Wis. 1976); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 617-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States
v. White, 386 F. Supp. 882, 884 (E.D. Wis. 1974); (5) violation of prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, see United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (7th Cir. 1979), cer. denied,
445 U.S. 946 (1980). See generaiiy Atkinson, supra note 6, at 3-9.
168. See general United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (8th Cir. 1980); Com-
ment, supra note 49, at 100-01; Note, supra note 48, at 120-21.
169. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
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include crimes punishable under state law, federal jurisdiction is ex-
tended into traditional fields of state law enforcement. A broad inter-
pretation of the term "enterprise" that includes defendants associated
in fact only to commit a pattern of racketeering activities is a usurpa-
tion of state criminal jurisdiction. Neither RICO's language 170 nor its
legislative history' 7 ' contemplates such a broad expansion of federal
jurisdiction.
An expansive interpretation of the term "enterprise" that renders the
enterprise element redundant of a pattern of racketeering activity also
raises double jeopardy concerns.172 The enterprise requirement is a
pivotal element in the constitutionality of section 1962(c).' 73 Because a
defendant can be prosecuted separately for the crimes that form the
"pattern of racketeering activity," a prosecution under section 1962(c)
avoids violating the guarantee against double jeopardy only by requir-
ing proof of a fact other than the facts required to prove the predicate
offenses.174 This separate fact as contemplated by section 1962(c) is the
defendants' association with an enterprise operating in interstate com-
merce. Where, however, the defendant has already been prosecuted for
the underlying racketeering acts, 75 is then prosecuted under RICO,
and the enterprise element of the section 1962(c) violation consists only
of the defendant's association in committing the underlying racketeer-
ing acts, the prosecution under section 1962(c) of RICO amounts to
double jeopardy.'76
170. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
171. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text. In United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct.
2524 (1981), the Supreme Court dismissed the problem of federal encroachment on state criminal
jurisdiction. In the Turkelle Court's opinion:
Congress ... enact[ed] the measure, knowing that it would alter somewhat the role of
the Federal Government in the war against organized crime and that the alterations
would entail prosecutions involving acts of racketeering that are also crimes under state
law. There is no argument that Congress acted beyond its power in so doing. That being
the case, the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute.
Id. at 2530.
172. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. See generally United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1367-68 (8th Cir. 1980); Bradley, supra note 7, at 855-56.
173. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1980).
174. Id.
175. Defendants can be separately prosecuted for the two predicate crimes. United States v.
Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v.
Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
176. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1367 (8th Cir. 1980); Bradley; supra note
7, at 855-56.
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One court addressing the double jeopardy dilemma'" extricated it-
self from the problem by basing the RICO prosecution on crimes for
which the defendants had not been previously prosecuted.'78 If the de-
fendants had been penalized previously on all of the offenses alleged as
predicate acts under section 1961(1) of RICO and the court read "en-
terprise" broadly as encompassing the predicate offenses, the charges
might amount only to reprosecution for the earlier offenses. This
would present serious double jeopardy concerns. 79
The implicit conclusion that a RICO "enterprise" exists when de-
fendants associate only to commit the underlying offenses that form a
pattern of racketeering activity expands RICO far beyond the scope of
its statutory language' 80 and legislative history.'8 ' Such an interpreta-
tion reads the term "enterprise" out of RICO and thus violates the rule
of statutory construction that every word in a statute be accorded
meaning1 2 As a result it transforms the statute into a mere proscrip-
tion against patterns of racketeering activity. A definition of enterprise
that rests solely on individuals' associations to commit a pattern of
racketeering activity renders RICO constitutionally infirm for two rea-
sons: First, it expands federal criminal jurisdiction into areas tradition-
ally of state concern,'83 and, second, it creates a real threat of
transgression of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy. 184
IV. CONCLUSION
The RICO enterprise requirement has presented two difficult
problems. The first issue, whether the term "enterprise" encompasses
illegitimate, as well as legitimate, organizations, was resolved affirma-
tively by the Supreme Court in United States v. Turkette. 5 Although
RICO's legislative history8 6 and well-settled rules of statutory inter-
177. United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 149-50 supra.
183. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 172-76 supra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 95-115 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 58-73 supra and accompanying text.
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pretation' 87 favor a construction of "enterprise" limited to legitimate
organizations, nothing in RICO's statutory language prevents the
Turkette interpretation. 8 Resolution of the second issue, whether the
term "enterprise" encompasses individuals associated only to commit a
pattern of racketeering activity, is, however, critical to the proper appli-
cation of RICO. The implicit conclusion of the lower federal courts
that "enterprise" can be defined as the defendant's associations to com-
mit racketeering acts reads the pivotal enterprise requirement out of
RICO, violates the rule of statutory construction that meaning be ac-
corded every word in a statute, 89 and creates serious questions con-
cerning the constitutionality of RICO. 90
Only the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Ander-
son,' 9' has directly addressed the issue. The court's conclusion that the
term "enterprise" encompasses only associations that can be defined
apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the "pat-
tern of racketeering activity" is clearly correct. It is unfortunate that
the Supreme Court failed to settle this issue clearly in Turkette. When
the Court is again faced with the issue, the Anderson decision will stand
as a guide to its proper resolution.
Joan Hagen Spiegel
187. See notes 74-96 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 149-50 & 156-59 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 167-78 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 136-45 supra and accompanying text.
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